The Book ‘Political Disinformation and the Law’: Some Insights into the Regulation of Disinformation
Christopher Phiri recently published the book Political Disinformation and the Law. The book explores the interplay between the regulation of disinformation and freedom of expression within the context of a democratic society governed by the rule of law. In this contribution, Christopher shares some of the key insights from the book about the topic.
Background: safeguarding freedom of expression in an age of disinformation regulation
We live in an age of disinformation regulation. Current regulatory efforts in Europe focus on disinformation spread through major online platforms. The European Union in particular prides itself on having spearheaded the world‑first regulatory model based on a privately enforced code since 2018. This model has recently been integrated into the legally binding framework of the Digital Services Act of 2022. It, however, appears that the European Union’s regulatory approach still leaves a great deal to be desired.
One reason is simple. The problem of disinformation does not exist only on major online platforms. These platforms have indeed transformed how disinformation spreads, but have not necessarily replaced traditional means of communication. People may still encounter disinformation in person and through traditional media. In Finland, for example, a recent survey found that radio listenership remains steady, reaching over 80 per cent of the population each week. If disinformation is regulated because it can cause harm, the same concern applies whether it spreads through a major online platform or any other medium.
There is a second, and perhaps more serious, problem. Current regulatory measures task private online platform operators with deciding what counts as disinformation and with suppressing it. In effect, these private actors assume a role ordinarily reserved for judicial authorities in democratic societies. They end up shaping the practical limits of freedom of expression, including the right to communicate and to receive information online. This is especially troubling in Europe, where ‘disinformation’ is not clearly defined. Without a clear definition, it is difficult to distinguish disinformation from other content protected by freedom of expression. By the same token, current regulatory measures not only threaten freedom of expression but also risk intensifying political and social polarisation in public discourse.
A question that arises in turn is whether there is still a way to holistically regulate disinformation without undermining freedom of expression. My recent book, Political Disinformation and the Law: Safeguarding Freedom of Expression in Europe (published in the Routledge Research in Human Rights Law book series), argues that there is. It contends that public regulation is in fact necessary to safeguard freedom of expression itself. But progress depends on three foundational steps that appear to be missing from current regulatory efforts.
Step one: clarify what we mean by disinformation, or we over‑ and/or under‑regulate it
The term ‘disinformation’ is widely used but rarely clearly defined. What this means in practice is that anyone can label any information they find unfavourable as disinformation, and deem information they find favourable not to be disinformation. And therein lies the danger of attempting to regulate disinformation without a clear definition.
European policymakers have yet to settle on a concrete definition of disinformation. The book shows that the European Commission has adopted at least three differently worded policy definitions since 2018, all of which appear to be both too ambiguous and vague to serve as a basis for regulatory action. What is more, the current Code of Conduct on Disinformation adopts the broadest and loosest of the three definitions. It requires private online platform operators to suppress ‘Disinformation’, defined so broadly that it covers not only deliberately misleading content but also ‘misinformation’ and other more nebulous notions, including ‘information influence operations’ and ‘foreign interference in the information space’.
To preserve freedom of expression, any regulation must start with a clear definition that distinguishes disinformation from legitimately protected categories of expression. The book proposes that, for regulatory purposes, disinformation should be defined as misleading information that is communicated with intent to mislead and that may cause harm. It uses the term ‘political disinformation’ to denote disinformation relating to important matters of public interest, precisely because this is what calls for a holistic regulatory response.
Step two: recognise the primary threat necessitating regulation, or we have no compelling regulatory objective
It has become fashionable to cast disinformation as a threat to democracy and other ill‑defined social values. The book flips this framing. It treats disinformation as a threat to individual freedom. The book sees individual freedom as both an ecumenical value and a gateway good: a good that brings other goods in its train. Democracy is but one such good.
This framing matters. The practical impact of regulatory measures can vary drastically depending on whether they are designed to protect freedom itself or other goods that freedom enables. The book maintains that democracy and other public goods that political disinformation may threaten would be effectively and holistically protected by safeguarding freedom of expression, especially the individual right to receive information and to be properly informed.
Step three: openly acknowledge and define the role of the state, or we live at the mercy of others
It is rather unfortunate that policymakers are increasingly relying on online platform operators and other private actors to regulate disinformation on their behalf. This abdication of public responsibilities undercuts the equal protection of individual rights afforded by the rule of law. Private actors naturally prioritise their own interests and lack the necessary competence to make legal judgments about the scope of individual rights. Only courts of competent jurisdiction can ensure the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression. It is also disingenuous for policymakers to pressure online platform operators to suppress alleged disinformation under private codes and then deny responsibility for the resulting infringements of freedom of expression.
To safeguard freedom of expression and ensure meaningful democratic accountability, the book advocates a two‑pronged regulatory strategy that combines rapid correction mechanisms and sanction mechanisms, and clearly defines the role of the state. It proposes correction mechanisms modelled on the right of reply, an essential element of freedom of expression itself, which would be enforceable through the apparatus of the state. In the same vein, the book proposes targeted sanctions and maintains that only independent public courts should issue appropriate orders and impose proportionate penalties on purveyors of disinformation. Together, these mechanisms are designed to provide practical legal safeguards for freedom of expression.
Who is the book for, and what is its core message to readers?
Written as a scholarly contribution, the book covers a wide theoretical and practical ground. It promises to be useful to anyone interested in public law and the role of the state generally. It also speaks to specialists in human rights law, media law, legal philosophy, media and communication studies and information science, including academics, judges and policymakers.
Different readers, depending on their respective perspectives and interests, may take away different messages from the book. However, if I had to choose one key message that I hope readers (including those who may disagree with the substantive positions taken in the book) will take away on the specific topic of disinformation regulation, it would be the following. Regulating disinformation is necessary but demands hard work. It requires at least three foundational steps: clearly defining the information phenomenon to be regulated, setting a clear regulatory objective and developing a holistic regulatory model that clearly defines the role of the state and affords equal protection of individual rights, not least the right to freedom of expression, through the rule of law.
About the Author
Christopher Phiri (LLD, LLM, MBA, LLB) is a Postdoctoral Researcher in the Faculty of Law, University of Turku, and an Advocate of the Superior Courts of Zambia. His research is mostly cross-disciplinary and focuses on public law, with particular emphasis on the regulation of information and communication in the digital public sphere. He is currently conducting his research within the framework of the Dynamics of Digital Rights in Europe (DDR‑EUR) project (2024–2028) funded by the Research Council of Finland.
Photo by Marta Nogueira on Pexels (https://insights.utu.fi/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/creative-photo-of-an-open-book-on-stacked-colorful-books-symbolizing-learning-and-literature.-17295856-scaled.jpg)
